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BOOK REVIEWS
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN

GERMANY AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT.

By Edward McWhinney; Leyden, Holland: A. W. Sythoff, 1962. Pp. 71.
$3.85.
In recent years there has been a steady flow of writings by legal scholars
and political scientists on the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional and
political system. But little attention has been given to comparable bodies in other
Western countries--such as the Italian, German or Austrian constitutional tribunals-which, possessing similar powers, create and confront similar problems
as our Supreme Court.
Professor Edward McWhinney is one of the few non-German scholars who
have written about the most powerful and active of these tribunals, the Federal
Constitutional Court of West Germany. His Constitutionalismin Germany and
the FederalConstitutionalCourt, which is for the most part an adaptation of an
article previously published in the Harvard Law Review,' briefly explains the
powers and operations of the Court, analyzes some of the developments in its
jurisprudence and offers some lessons from the German experience for American
students of constitutional politics.
The Federal Constitutional Court was created by the Bonn Constitution of
1949, and is a product of both American influence and of earlier German practice.
It possesses the power, inter alia, to review the constitutionality of legislative and
executive acts, to decide disputes involving the members of the federation and
even disputes among organs of the national government, to resolve election disputes, to act as the impeachment tribunal for judges and the Federal President,
and to hear so-called "constitutional complaints" from citizens about alleged
deprivation of their constitutional rights by governmental action.
The Federal Constitutional Court is remarkable not only for the wide scope
and political sensitivity of its jurisdiction. American readers will be particularly
interested in the bifurcated structure of the Court (two separate 10-judge
."senates" both handing down decisions as "the Federal Constitutional Court");
the anonymity of its decisions (neither the outcome of its votes nor dissenting
views are, normally, published by the Court); its narrow specialization in constitutional questions (separate supreme courts for civil, criminal and administrative
matters having been created in accordance with traditional German practice);
and the election of its judges by the two houses of the national legislature.
The Federal Constitutional Court began its work in 1951 and has since then
received over 1,000 cases of varying constitutional and political importance, and
some 10,000 constitutional complaints. Assessing its work over the first ten years,
McWhinney distinguishes three periods roughly paralleling the tenure of the
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Court's three chief justices. The early years (1951-1954) are described as mainly
characterized by self-restraint; a period of political caution and institutional consolidation during which the Court "tried to build for the future and seems to have
accepted as a main instrument for achieving this result a policy of hastening
slowly, and of preventing or limiting itself from being drawn into essentially
political controversies." Thereafter, McWhinney argues, "the judges gathered
strength," and entered into a period (1954-1959) of judicial experimentation and
innovation. As illustrative of this phase, McWhinney cites the development of the
doctrine of "federal comity," a doctrine imposing on the partners in the West
German federation an ill-defined and only implied constitutional obligation of
reasonableness and cooperation in federal relations. Also characteristic of this
middle period, McWhinney suggests, was the decision in which the Court ruled
that the 1933 German-Vatican treaty could not control subjects reserved by the
constitution to the states, regardless of the obligations of implementation which
international law might- create for the national government-a rule in notable
contrast to our Supreme Court's Missouri v. Holland.2 Other illustrative examples
include the Federal Constitutional Court's generous and imaginative interpretation of the equal rights clause of the constitution and an "interests-balancing"
approach in the decision outlawing the Communist Party.
Beginning roughly in 1959, McWhinney writes, the Court began a new
phase in which it "grasped the nettle and entered into a new philosophy of
almost liberal activism, in terms of which the judges seem not afraid to challenge
the Bund regime itself." As evidence of this new trend, McWhinney cites a series
of decisions in which the Court has acted as the "guardian of the election process," invalidating several election laws that discriminated against independent
candidatures. But his most striking example is the so-called Fernseh (Television) case s in which the Court struck down the Adenauer government's attempt
to set up a second, federally-controlled television network over state government
opposition. It was with this case, McWhinney maintains, "that the Federal Constitutional Court may really be said to have come of age, for, for the first time, a
court decision put the Court into direct conflict with the Bund government on a
matter of policy which the Bund government considered vital... 2
McWhinney's thesis of a gradual and distinct development from early
caution to current activism has a certain plausibility; but it is not quite persuasive. For instance, one could point to the Court's lack of caution when it invited
the government's wrath, and provoked a serious crisis, by refusing to accommodate it in the litigation over the abortive European Defense Community treaty in
the winter of 1952-53; or one could point to its enunciation of quite controversial
doctrines in its early years, such as its formulation of a constitutional defense of
legislation aimed against splinter parties and its discovery of principles "superior" to the constitution.
2.
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Such exceptions do not prove McWhinney's rule; they suggest ,tbat the
pattern of the Court's behavior is still open to other interpretations, It might
perhaps have been fruitful to examine patterns of restraint and activism not on
a chronological but on a subject-matter basis. Certainly, McWhinney's attempt
to determine distinct trends in the performance of the Court invites the question
whether an examination of landmark cases in particular important areas is an
adequate method for arriving at significant generalizations. By 1962 the Court
had decided almost 500 cases (in addition to nearly 7,000 constitutional complaints) ; it did not hand down a decision on the merits in over 500 cases (plus
some 2,500 constitutional complaints) which had been brought before it. Conclusions about judicial self-restraint will need analysis not only of the Court's
important decisions and obiter dicta, but also of such matters as its opportunities
and refusals to act or the frequency at which it disappoints the government in
litigation. Quantitative analysis-of a court's work can obviously not provide fully
adequate conclusions about its policy of self-restraint; but neither will such imprecise references as McWhinney's mention of a "handful" of federal statutes
having been invalidated by the Court before 1960: The Court, in fact, invalidated portions of no less than 27 federal statutes in that period.
McWhinney's assessment of the work of the Court is almost uniformly
favorable, and in this respect he is at one with other American, although certainly not with all German, writers on the Federal Constitutional Court. He
expresses particular approval of the "judicially assisted revival of federalism"
through numerous decisions of the Court, arguing that the case law which the
Court has developed both strengthened the West German federal system and
offers instructive examples to other federal states.
Also of interest to American students of constitutional law are McWhinney's
remarks on the question of judicial self-restraint. German experience confirms, he.
believes, that "the theory and practice of judicial self-restraint are larger than
the shadow of a single United States Supreme Court judge and are indeed a necessary part of the informed techniques of every constitutional court, and especially
perhaps of the constitutional court that would essay a liberal activist role."
Some of the conclusions which McWhinney reaches seem to lack fully convincing or sufficiently detailed evidence. For example, his statement that "to the
extent that judicial legislation should be called for in aid of or in substitution for
the formal constitutional amending power, a more highly personalized judicial
rule than the present essentially anonymous one seems certain to emerge on the
Court." Might it not be possible that judicial anonymity would be a useful and
welcome protection from political retaliation in such circumstances? Also, there
is the contention by McWhinney that the Court decided to outlaw the Communist Party after a delay of five years only "to allay some judicial doubts as to
the continuity of the Court's personality before and after its renewal through the
regular periodical election of judges." This completely ignores the fact that the
292
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Court Reform Act passed in 1956 forced the first senate of the Court to hand
down a decision or be deprived of jurisdiction over the case.
McWhinney's book represents a modest chapter in the still rather neglected
but potentially fruitful study of comparative constitutional politics. American
readers will probably find this volume most interesting and useful for its concise
summaries of the more important decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court
although the book will be of limited value to the specialist. A full-length scholarly
work on the Court remains yet to be written, in either German or English.
JOHN C. LANE

Assistant Professor of Political Science
State University of New York at Buffalo
A STUDY OF INDInImUAL PRACTITIONERS IN CHICAGO.
By Jerome E. Carlin; New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University
Press, 1962. Pp. 234. $6.00.

LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN:

This book should be of interest and of some value to practicing lawyers, law
teachers and students, bar association officers, judges and all those concerned
with the legal profession.
The author, who is both a sociologist and a lawyer, made a statistical study
in depth, in the summer of 1957, in the City of Chicago, of 84 lawyers engaged
in, or who listed themselves as engaged in, private practice as individual practitioners. At that time there were approximately 12,000 lawyers in Chicago, of
whom about 7,000 were individual practitioners. The 84 lawyers interviewed were
chosen at random. The interviews were based on a long, detailed prepared list of
searching questions and each interview lasted on the average about two hours. By
and large, says the author, the lawyers interviewed were extremely cooperative and
far more candid than he had expected. The answers were taken down verbatim.
The number of lawyers interviewed was small, being only a little over one
percent of the total number of individual practitioners in Chicago. Actually, the
percentage may have been even smaller. The 84 interviewees included 6 young
salaried lawyers just getting started, and 11 lawyers who were no longer in
private practice. In the analysis of the interview data, the information about
these 17 was taken into account in the conclusions set forth in the first chapter
of the book, but, for the most part was not considered in arriving at the conclusions discussed in the rest of the book.
The author classified the remaining 67 of those interviewed as engaged
essentially in full-time, independent private practice. However, of these: (a) 7
worked to some extent for other lawyers, but half or more of their time and
income was devoted to or derived from their own private practice; (b) 8 had
considerable outside business interests, but none of these derived more than
half of his income from such pursuits; and (c) 3 each had a principal corporate

